CyDES

Project description

How vulnerable are the systems used by the Power-to-Power company, to variant cyber-attacks and current hacking trends/groups?

Context

This project investigates cybersecurity risks in distributed energy systems (DES) that support the renewable energy transition, such as solar-driven hydrogen production and seasonal storage using green gas. Because these systems are increasingly interconnected and digitally controlled via ICS/SCADA networks, they become attractive targets for cyber adversaries. A successful attack could disrupt energy production, compromise safety, undermine reliability, and cause major economic or even geopolitical consequences.

The work begins with a structured threat analysis to identify likely attackers, their motivations, and relevant attack vectors. Based on the results, realistic cyberattack scenarios will be designed and simulated in a controlled environment to assess impacts on system availability, safety, and resilience. The project combines literature research, field research (e.g., interviews and possible site visits), and hands-on lab experiments, using the DOT framework to guide methodology. Early sprints focus on learning, exploration, and small-scale tests, while later sprints expand into more advanced scenarios and documentation. The outcome will support the CyDES initiative by informing the development of a robust security architecture for DES.

Results

The project’s most important outcomes are a practical demonstration platform plus a set of evidence-based insights into how cyberattacks can compromise distributed energy systems that rely on ICS/SCADA-style control. The main product is a realistic, repeatable OT lab environment that models a “mini Power-to-Power” setup: a segmented network with routing/firewalling, a SCADA component, a PLC component, an HMI/simulation layer (Factory IO), and an attacker workstation, communicating via typical industrial protocols such as Modbus. This environment is valuable because it turns cybersecurity from an abstract discussion into something you can observe, reproduce, and measure safely—without touching any real infrastructure—making it a solid foundation for future CyDES testing, training, and architecture decisions.

A second key product is a pair of working proof-of-concept attack scenarios supported by scripts. One scenario demonstrates man-in-the-middle capability through ARP spoofing, traffic capture, and replay against the supervisory control layer. The other scenario demonstrates direct manipulation of PLC behavior by writing Modbus coils to force process actions such as filling or discharging. Their value is that they show concrete process impact—availability disruption and safety-relevant behavior changes—rather than just theoretical risk, helping stakeholders understand how “cyber” issues can translate into physical consequences.

On the insights side, the project clarifies where the attack surface concentrates in distributed/connected energy setups: PLCs, SCADA/HMI nodes, engineering workstations, OT network boundaries, and remote access paths. It also demonstrates how widely used OT protocols and default-style deployments can be fragile when authentication, encryption, and integrity protections are absent, enabling low-effort manipulation and escalation. These insights are translated into actionable guidance such as tighter network segmentation, stronger access control and credential hygiene, careful exposure management of controllers and edge devices, and increased awareness of phishing and operator-facing compromise routes.

The value of these outcomes is supported by the project’s validation approach: iterative development with stakeholder input (including tool and setup choices) and demonstrated results during sprint reviews, showing that the environment and scenarios were understandable, repeatable, and informative to the intended audience. In TRL terms, and reflecting your position as students, the work is best framed as a proof-of-concept method and demonstrator rather than a deployed solution: it was built and validated experimentally in a controlled lab setting, but not operationally proven in real installations. That places it roughly around TRL 3–4—strong enough to inform design and risk discussions, and to serve as a launchpad for more mature defenses and real-world validation later.